L. P. Hartley famously wrote that the past is a foreign country; they do things differently there. Rob Boddice, the subject of Gal Beckerman’s Atlantic profile, apparently imprinted on that line shortly after hatching. Boddice argues that we project our own emotional categories backward — pain, love, grief, even “human nature” — when in reality, experience is historically made, not universally shared. Even a carpenter’s smashed thumb is, in effect, a foreign language.
The universalism that Boddice mistrusts is a relatively new concept in human history. It comes to us from the Enlightenment. The presumption that all people share a common nature was dreamed up by European intellectuals sitting in their salons. Plenty of critics, starting with postcolonial thinkers, now understand this to have been an ideological attempt to exert power and order over a world that had recently become bigger and stranger. But this impulse toward uniformity is not just an 18th-century one. Freudian psychology also reduced the dynamism of the human mind to a machine powered by predictable and shared drives. By the time we get to our current globalized culture, in which a Korean thriller can win Best Picture at the Oscars and Latin pop stars dominate the U.S. charts, the notion that our emotional registers are all essentially alike feels self-evident.
Mwah! This is so perfectly calibrated to modern midwit pieties. The Enlightenment: a club of privileged European males in powdered wigs inventing “human nature” as a fig leaf to cover the White Phallus of Power as it raped its way through the diversity of history. Before that, apparently, nobody had ever noticed that human beings have anything in common, least of all the Christians, with their quaint doctrine that man is made in the image of God, and their bizarre hobby of preaching to all nations. Or the Stoics, who somehow developed a universal moral vocabulary without the benefit of a Paris salon. Terence: “Nothing human is alien to me”? Montaigne: “Every man bears the whole stamp of the human condition”? Take a seat, boys, The Atlantic is here with the highly-credentialed to explain the world atcha.
To understand what the carpenter experiences, then, we need to begin with a series of questions that might help us reconstruct the meaning produced once the signal reaches its destination. Does this happen a lot? Is the sensation of hitting his thumb a daily or weekly occurrence—something that goes with the job? And then, if religion infused every second of his life, as might very well be true for a medieval carpenter, where would his concept of suffering come from? Does he think about Christ and perhaps feel purified? If suffering, sin, and love are conjoined in an idea of the divine in the carpenter’s brain, and these are “lived connections,” Boddice said, “and you’re surrounded by them,” how might he feel when that hammer hits his thumb?
It no longer seems so simple as just saying “pain.” We cannot put the carpenter in an MRI machine—we will never have total access to his feelings—but by building out his world in all of its dimensions, Boddice believes, we can get closer to appreciating the specificity of those feelings. This points to another radical element of Boddice’s thinking: To re-create an experience, you need to know all of the conditions that may have led the brain to originally create it, and this means bringing dozens of different academic disciplines to bear on the task, getting fields that don’t usually mingle to interact with one another.
This is the real work of art. Yes, you’re reading that correctly: here we’re told that to understand what it “felt like” for a medieval carpenter to hit his thumb with a hammer, you’ll need a kind of academic Avengers initiative: theology, archaeology, art history, material culture, semiotics, perhaps a visiting chair in Comparative Thumb Studies, and a grant. Only then may you begin to approach the mysteriously foreign experience known as “pain.”
Now, I’ll grant the modest point hidden under the grandiosity. People don’t just feel sensations; they interpret them. The same event, a hammer-smashed thumb, can be filtered through pride, shame, religion, habit, fear of lost wages, or the general anxiety of living in a world where God is watching and your tools are trying to kill you. Fine. Culture supplies scripts. Narratives matter. Buddhists, who of course didn’t appear until the Enlightenment, would call it clinging: the thumb hurts, but the story you attach to it — “I’m a clumsy failure and this is why my wife left me,” “This always happens to me, why am I so cursed” — hurts extra.
Still, the fact that meaning is flexible does not mean meaning is infinite. It doesn’t follow that slave labor under the desert sun was a rollicking good time in the right cultural context. It doesn’t follow that the medieval carpenter might have experienced a broken thumb as a wave of orgasmic rapture. The space of plausible interpretations may be wider than first thought, but it isn’t boundless. Human beings can be culturally varied without being mythical creatures. This is where Boddice’s extreme skepticism resembles something like travelogue-fantasy: the fetishization of difference as an end in itself. It reminds me of Pliny the Elder dutifully describing faraway islands where the inhabitants are all ears, or Marco Polo’s dog-headed cannibals. The past becomes an exotic zoo, and the historian becomes the docent.
And you’ll notice how selectively the skepticism is applied. If “experience” is sealed inside a vault unless we reconstruct “all the conditions,” there’s no reason to stop at medieval carpenters. My neighbors are also concept-laden brains in dark skulls with culturally trained categories. Taken seriously, the view doesn’t just make the past foreign; it makes the present unknowable, and logically points the way to solipsism. (And yet, miraculously, the academic Avengers can still deduce the “true” feeling from texts and artifacts.) But ordinary life plainly assumes the opposite — that we can understand one another well enough to cooperate, console, forgive, punish, and love. My assumption is that Boddice, with his tedious “down with empathy” provocations, is probably making a bid to be the next pop-academic superstar milking the Freakonomics template of counterintuitive insights. I can easily imagine “people in the past didn’t feel the same emotions we do” becoming the next “Eskimos-have-200-words-for-snow.”
Which brings me to the correct research method, and it requires only one professor: Samuel Johnson. If someone tells you we can’t understand an injured thumb without dozens of academic disciplines, a Johnsonian response suggests itself: pick up a hammer, hit his thumb, and say, over top of his howls and curses, “I refute Boddice thus.”