I suppose now is the appropriate moment to run through the expected reassurances. No, I don’t condone plagiarism or fabrication of data. And neither do I share, at all, the institutional priorities that got Arday hired in the first place. His dissertation looks like a hot mess — a simulacrum of a contribution to a slapdash field that itself, in my view, should have no place in any institution bearing the name of a university. But who gives a shit? The integrity of our institutions —obviously, unquestionably— is not worth a single human life.

I can only read the first four paragraphs, because I let my subscription to Smith-Ruiu’s Substack expire some time ago. On this evidence, I see it as money well saved.
One might argue that a concern with “the integrity of our institutions” is about honoring the best of countless previous human lives, and that squandering it on any individual, let alone a simple con artist, is — obviously, unquestionably — a stupid thing to do. And even leaving that Burkean argument aside, institutional integrity has present human beneficiaries. If a university knowingly protects fabricated scholarship because exposing it might devastate the fabricator, who pays? Honest scholars. Students. Other applicants who followed the rules. Researchers who rely on the literature. The institution’s future graduates whose credentials become marginally less trustworthy. The costs disperse, so none of them produces the emotionally overwhelming image of one dead man. But dispersed costs are still human costs.
Put one identifiable person on one side of the scale and an abstraction on the other. A human life vs. “institutional integrity.” Well, naturally the human being wins. But describe the conflict charitably and the picture changes: “One individual’s interest in avoiding the consequences of exposure vs. the interests of thousands of other people, living and dead, in maintaining a system in which fraud is investigated and standards mean something.” Now we actually have a moral problem. One might expect a professional philosopher to have an interest in such things.
Arday himself seems to possess remarkably little agency in this telling. He “only ended up” producing a fake dissertation because the university forced a storyteller into the mold of scholarship; then the exposure of that fraud had his death as its “direct result.” At each morally significant juncture, circumstances and other people act upon Arday, while the bean counters retain enough agency to bear full responsibility for their actions. The fabulous protagonist gets causes; the “little nerds” get culpability. And those “little nerds” he contrasts with the fabulous are, in large part, the people who keep the inheritance intact: checking citations, preserving records, refusing fabrication, teaching what they actually know, and doing their small part without expecting the institution to reorganize itself around their personalities.
Amusingly, Smith-Ruiu concedes that the bean counters are technically correct, but they’re evidently correct for the wrong reasons. Plagiarism, fabrication of data, DEI programs, even the fraudulent soft sciences themselves have no place in a university, according to him. So far, so conservative. But if higher education is really so debased that Arday’s dissertation was merely a simulacrum of scholarship in a field that should not exist, then why is the tragic injustice that Arday could not flourish within it? Why should this magnificent storyteller have wanted its professorships, titles, salaries, prestige, and symbolic capital? Why are we supposed to care either way that a conman came to a bad end in a den of thieves?
Let me put it this way. If Arday had been a colorless fifty-eight-year-old departmental administrator with a bad comb-over and clothing from Kohl’s who fabricated precisely the same material, I strongly suspect nobody would be writing elegies about his Promethean imagination. But he was not. He was young and photogenic, with “exquisite locks and threads and general self-display.” (George Santos’s self-invention, by contrast, looked tacky, ridiculous, and grasping. He did not receive the aesthetic subsidy of tragic grandeur. He was short, pudgy, and worst of all, a Republican. No paeans for him.)
Aside from the absurdity of seeing a philosopher pompously proclaim vacuous refrigerator-magnet slogans about “a single human life,” this is what repulses me the most: seeing one becoming so enchanted by charisma, style and transgression that the dull virtues begin to look contemptible by comparison. If all it takes to make those virtues seem petty is a handsome man in eyeliner, then perhaps the bean counters are not the people displaying the shallower moral imagination.













