My thesis, again, is a simple one. The information technologies of the twenty-first century have enabled the public, composed of amateurs, people from nowhere, to break the power of the political hierarchies of the industrial age. The result hasn’t been a completed revolution in the manner of 1789 or 1917, or utter collapse as in 1991, but more like the prolonged period of instability that preceded the settlement of Westphalia in 1648. Neither side can wipe out the other. A resolution, when it comes, may well defy the terms of the struggle. None is remotely visible as I write these lines.
— Martin Gurri, The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium
The internet didn’t invent deception, of course, but it did make mediation the default condition of social life. Most of us have probably heard the old joke from the New Yorker: on the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog. Once you live through screens, you’re always inferring a reality you cannot directly inspect. Even when nobody is lying, the medium itself encourages curation, performance, selective lighting, selective framing. A fragile trust is inherent from the start.
Social media monetized that uncertainty. It turned identity into a product and status into a scoreboard. It incentivized us to treat the self as a brand and attention as a currency — quantified, gamable, and therefore permanently vulnerable to counterfeiting. Filters, lighting, editing, branding, metrics; none of it is “fake” in the simple sense. It’s real, but optimized. And optimization is the prelude to suspicion, because it blurs the line between honest self-presentation and calculated manipulation.
As Gurri explains in his excellent book, the basic claim that institutions can certify reality — this is true; this is false; these are the rules; this is what happened — has been weakened. That doesn’t mean institutions are always wrong, or that the public is always right. It means the power to end arguments by proclamation has decayed. The public can keep disputes permanently open. Competing narratives can be built cheaply, distributed instantly, and defended by swarms of “people from nowhere.” Arguments metastasize, every claim begins to feel like propaganda, every correction begins to feel like power protecting itself, every disagreement starts to carry the tone of betrayal. You don’t merely think I’m mistaken; you think I’m captured, paid, brainwashed, malignant, or stupid. And once that adversarial posture becomes political weather, it spreads. “Chaos rampant, an age of distrust. Confrontation, impulsive habitat,” the metal band Slayer sang, describing hell, social media, or both.
For a while, we still had reliable tells. Spam looked like spam. Machine writing sounded like a machine. Bad Photoshop had a visible sheen. The reassuring thing about fakery was that it was legible.
Generative AI is an accelerant because it collapses the tells. It produces competent imitation at scale — text, images, voices, short videos — often good enough to pass the first glance, sometimes good enough to pass the second. So the aesthetic question (“is it good?”) gets replaced by a forensic question: “Who made this, how, and do they deserve credit?” When outputs get cheap, the status war moves to authorship and provenance. Everyone becomes a customs officer stamping passports of authenticity.
It’s common to say “online isn’t real life,” and for a long time that was comforting because in-person reality could still function as the ultimate lie detector. Filters might beautify a photo, but presence would reassert itself up close. You can curate your profile, but you can’t curate your face at close range under ordinary lighting on an ordinary day. Digital editing can’t firm up a weak handshake.
Except now the body itself is becoming a kind of interface, not so much because bodies are “fake” than because the meaning of a body is less legible. PEDs and GLP-1s create an actual result, not a mere illusion. The suspicious question isn’t “is that physique real?” It’s: “What does it signify?”
For decades, we treated physical transformations — lean bodies, muscular bodies, big lifts, dramatic before-and-after stories — as costly credentials. We read them as moral evidence: discipline, self-control, sacrifice, will. You could argue about how fair that moral reading was, but it was socially legible. It made sorting easy. Now, a person can be leaner because appetite has been pharmacologically altered. A person can be bigger and stronger because recovery and hypertrophy are pharmacologically assisted. Now the old inference (“therefore virtue”) is unreliable because the method is opaque. And humans hate unreliable inference. We hate it the way we hate a loaded die: not only because it might be unfair, but because it makes the game hard to interpret.
Then comes the new complication: AI doesn’t arrive as just another tool, like a better wrench. People talk to it. It answers. It imitates personality. It can console, flatter, argue, roleplay. So even if it has no intentions in the strict sense, it reliably triggers the human perception of agency. A new force enters the already-chaotic field — something that can amplify messages, imitate people, generate culture, automate persuasion — and the public can’t agree what kind of thing it is. Friend, enemy, mercenary, or merely a new industrial capability. The disagreement itself becomes part of the atmosphere. Europe got a “German Question” in 1871. We’re getting an “AI Question” now.
Our atmosphere of suspicion is less paranoia than a rational adaptation to broken shortcuts. When cheap trust signals stop working, people do what they always do: they demand receipts (“prove it,” “disclose it,” “show your drafts,” “are you natural?”), they invent new tells (“AI slop,” “natty or not,” “Ozempic face”), and they fight to rewrite the moral code. It encourages moral entrepreneurship. Not everyone is seeking truth; everyone is seeking advantage. Authenticity becomes a weapon because authenticity is a status currency in a world where the old currency is being inflated.
It’s sort of like musical chairs. Technological change, as it often does, has set the music playing again, and people are circling around warily, hoping to be well-positioned in the scrum for a high-status seat once it stops. Eventually some settlement will arrive. Possibly, as Gurri says, one that defies the terms of the struggle. But for now, the defining feeling is that the old shortcuts for telling what’s real are failing, and we haven’t yet agreed on new ones.




